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Abstract 
Land conservation technologies are known to play an important role in improving farm 
incomes. For this reason substantial investments have been made in research to improve 
agricultural technologies in various parts of the world, from the development of new 
crop varieties to new practices of land management. The present study responds to the 
paucity of literature on determinants of land conservation practices in Kenya. The study 
builds on the few existing studies in this area and explores the impact of land rights and 
assets among other factors on adoption of soil conservation practices. The study further 
tests for Boserup's hypothesis and the evolutionary theory of land rights using both 
descriptive and econometric procedures. Primary data from households in a semi-arid 
district in Kenya are used to achieve the study objectives. Random effects probits are 
used to derive the parametric estimates of our models. The findings are that property 
right regimes and assets affect both the decision to conserve land and the type of 
conservation practices used by farmers. The results further suggest a positive correlation 
between land tenure security and population density, thus supporting Boserup's hypothesis 
as well as the evolutionary land rights theory. We also find that the poor are less likely to 
adopt land conservation practices than the non-poor. Education, available biomass, market 
development and location of the farm are also found to be important determinants of 
adoption. These findings call for pursuit of both short-term and long-term policy measures 
that offer incentives for land conservation through government initiatives and involvement 
of local communities. The recommended policy measures include enhanced security of 
tenure, targeted programmes for poverty alleviation, improved access to education, and 
development of social and physical infrastructure. 
Key words: Land conservation, property rights, assets, population density 
1. Introduction 
In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya included, agriculture remains one of the largest sectors in terms of contribution to GDP, employment generation, foreign exchange earnings and ensuring food security. The sector also provides important 
linkages with other sectors of the economy, including provision of raw materials to the 
industrial sector, purchase of inputs from the industrial sectors and exchange with the 
services sector (mostly banking and insurance). These countries are also characterized 
by large subsistence sectors, which make agriculture even more important for food 
security. Over the last two decades, however, agricultural production has declined because 
of soil erosion and degradation of agricultural land among other factors. Declining 
agricultural production contributes to rural poverty, which further exacerbates land 
degradation. It is well documented that poverty, agricultural stagnation and resource 
degradation are interlinked and that a set of exogenous and endogenous factors condition 
this link (WCED, 1987; see also Pleskovic and Stiglitz, 1997). The technologies people 
use play a fundamental role in shaping the efficiency, equity and environmental 
sustainability of natural resources. This has been reason for substantial investments in 
research to improve agricultural technologies, from new crop varieties to natural resource 
management practices (McCulloch et al., 1998). 
Traditionally, many African pastoralists and farm households responded to declining 
land productivity by abandoning existing degraded pasture and cropland and moving 
into new lands (Barbier, 1999). Today, with privatization of land and population pressure, 
rural people are compelled to remain on the same parcel of land. Where households are 
neither able to generate a market surplus nor fall back on markets for both agricultural 
produce and factors of production, they continue to use traditional production techniques. 
In such cases, soil fertility and structure deteriorate rapidly, crop yields decline, and soils 
erode. 
Land pressure and degradation is most acute in marginal pastoral areas, where livestock 
husbandry tends to have adverse effects on the environment. Available estimates show 
that overgrazing causes 35% of all human-induced soil degradation worldwide and 49% 
in Africa (Haen, 1993; Pinstrup-Anderson and Pandya-Lorch, 1994). Available evidence 
from Kenya also indicates that livestock activities and crop farming have contributed to 
environmental degradation and poverty especially in the arid and semi arid areas, which 
are characterized by a limited natural resource base and low carrying capacity. About 
25% of the poorest people in rural Kenya are concentrated on low-potential lands where 
inadequate or unreliable rainfall, adverse soil conditions, low soil fertility, and topography 
limit agricultural production and increase the risk of chronic land degradation (Republic 
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of Kenya, 1999). These less favourable agricultural lands, with their lower productivity 
potential, poor soils and physical characteristics, are easily prone to land degradation 
due to over cropping, poor farming practices and inadequate conservation measures, 
aggravated by rapidly increasing human and livestock populations. 
In spite of increased agricultural extension services, adoption of soil conservation 
practices is still poor especially in marginal ecological and socioeconomic settings. 
Conservation practices in crop and animal husbandry are still characterized by extensive 
systems, low level of external inputs and poor resource base, leading to further reduction 
in soil productivity. This not withstanding, little empirical evidence exists on the economic 
impact, drivers and consequences of degradation of agricultural land. Most studies focus 
on the impact of soil conservation on productivity (Tiffen et al., 1994). Lack of adequate 
empirical farm level data on the impact of socioeconomic factors on environmental 
degradation has hindered economic evaluation of alternative options and policies for 
sustainable land management in fragile ecological environments. Understanding the roots 
of environmental degradation and the deepening poverty, and designing appropriate 
policies and strategies for reversing the problem, requires careful analysis of the 
microeconomic behaviour of smallholder farmers (Shiferaw and Holden, 1999). This 
study addresses this research gap, focusing on the incentives for land conservation among 
smallholder farmers in fragile ecological environments in Kenya. It is motivated by the 
paucity of literature on determinants of land conservation practices in Kenya. We explore 
the impact of land rights and assets among other variables on the adoption of land 
improvements. Property rights are an important determinant of adoption of land 
conservation practices because they determine who benefits from productivity increases, 
both directly by determining who can reap the benefits of improvements in factor 
productivity, and indirectly through their effects on land markets, access to credit and the 
like (Place and Otsuka, 2000; Kebede, 2002). 
The study addresses the following questions: What are the main land conservation 
practices adopted by farmers in fragile ecological environments? What is the relationship 
between population density and property rights? Is there any correlation between land 
use practices and property right regimes? Are the poor able to conserve land? What 
factors favour land conservation? What is the link between property rights in land and 
investment in land conservation? What are the major policy issues that can ensure 
sustainable land conservation practices? 
Objectives of the study 
The general motivation of the study is to investigate the determinants of land conservation practices in Kenya with particular reference to Kajiado District. The 
specific objectives of the study are: 
• To investigate the major factors influencing adoption of land conservation practices. 
• To investigate the link between property rights in land, population density and adoption 
of land conservation practices. 
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• To determine the link between property rights in land and assets among other 
covariates on adoption of land conservation practices. 
• To simulate the impact of policy changes on adoption of land conservation practices. 
• To draw policy conclusions and recommendations for land conservation and poverty 
alleviation in Kenya. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses the land titling 
process and policy in Kenya. Section three describes the study site and also presents a 
detailed background of the study area. Sections four and five present the literature review 
and methodology, respectively. Section six presents the results while section seven 
concludes. 
2. Land Titling Process and Policy in Kenya 
Kenya's land policy is rooted in the foundation cast by the Berlin Conferences of 1884-1885 that sanctioned the partition of Africa among the European powers. In 1897 all "waste and unoccupied land" in Kenya was declared Crown Land, 
based on the argument that all land had in fact accrued to the imperial power simply by 
reason of assumption of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Kenya slipped very quickly into a territory 
of individual private estate owners the legitimacy of whose titles was derived from the 
imperial power (Okoth-Ogendo, 1999). By 1920 when Kenya became a colony, all land 
had been declared "Crown Land" and was therefore available for alienation to white 
settlers for use as private estates. Little consideration was given to land rights security 
for African cultivators and their land could be alienated at will by settlers. It was only 
after several inquiries and commissions that a clear separation in colonial law was made 
in 1938 between Crown Land out of which private titles could be granted, and "native 
lands", which were to be held in trust for those in actual occupation. 
No consolidated body of land law was enacted until 1963, when a Registered Land 
Act (now Cap 300) came into effect. This was meant to encourage individualism of 
tenure in line with the Swynnerton Plan. Up to that point and for a vast number of ex-
settler properties, the applicable regime remained the common law of England as modified 
by the doctrines of equity and statutes of general application. In the meantime, there was 
a series of attempts at a land policy. This is attested through the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 
as well as commissions, task forces and investigations into land policy development. 
These included the Kenya Land Commission of 1934, the East Africa Royal Commission 
of 1953-1955 and the Lawrence Commission of 1965-1966 (Okoth-Ogendo, 1999). 
Five years after independence, the Land (Group Representatives) Act (Cap 287) was 
enacted to legislate over group ranches. 
Despite Kenya's long experience with comprehensive land tenure reforms, little effort 
has been made to design innovative land rights systems and complementary infrastructure 
for the country. Not much has changed with respect to ownership rights since 1938, even 
though a great deal of policy development has in fact occurred. For example, private 
ownership rights remain as legitimate as they ever were in colonial times, "trust lands" 
are still held by statutory trustees rather than directly by indigenous occupants and 
unalienated land remains the private property of the government. 
Current situation 
The numerous laws and statutes governing land ownership in Kenya include: the Indian Transfer Property Act (1882), the Registered Land Act (Cap 300) and the 
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customary law system. The Indian Transfer of Property Act (ITPA) is an embodiment of 
English law extended to Kenya from India as early as 1882.This Act was necessary only 
as part of the administrative infrastructure of land relations within the settler community. 
It was meant to consolidate the settlers' grip on the acquired land, and governed property 
with regard to transfers, leases, mortgages and covenants. The Act embodies the freehold 
estate and applies to lands registered under the Crown Land Ordinances of 1902 and 
1915; the Lands Title Ordinance of 1908 (currently Cap 208), and the Conversion of 
Leases Regulations and Rules of 1960 (Odhiambo and Nyangito, 2002; Okoth-Ogendo, 
1999). 
The Registered Land Act (Cap 300), enacted in 1963, was the culmination of the 
reform programme started by the colonial government and aimed at replacing the 
customary law system of communal ownership of land with the English system. The Act 
confers ownership rights on individuals in a manner that is meant to be rational, efficient 
and productive in managing resources. The third legal property regime governing land 
use in Kenya is the informal law or customary law, which is multifaceted and diverse. In 
this law, informal rules, culture and community interpretations of the land property rights 
define governance systems across generations. Further laws governing land property 
rights include Government Lands Act (Cap 280) and the Land Titles Act (Cap 282) 
(Odhiambo and Nyangito, 2002). Other laws are embodied in the Land Disputes Tribunals 
Act (Cap 18, 1990) and the Survey Act (Cap 229). 
Under this diverse legal regime three key forms of land ownership have evolved in 
Kenya: private land, public land and customary land. 
Private land refers to individual/private tenure where exclusively individuals or 
companies own land. It is either freehold where the holder has absolute ownership or 
leasehold for a term of years subject to the payment of a land rent or certain conditions 
on development and usage. Acquisition of private land may follow up to three stages: 
The first is adjudication of individual or group rights under customary tenure to private 
tenure under the Land Adjudication Act, thus making customary land law obsolete 
(Kabubo-Mariara, 2003; Odhiambo and Nyangito, 2002). In the second stage, 
consolidation, each individual or group has rights and is allocated a single consolidated 
piece of land equivalent to several units under the Land Consolidation Act. Finally, the 
third stage is registration and entry of rights in the Adjudication Register (in the Land 
Registry) and the issuance of a certificate of ownership, under the Registered Land Act 
(Cap 300) and the Land Titles Act (Cap 282). 
Customary land 
Land under customary tenure is held communally. It is also known as trust land. Under 
this tenure, absolute rights over land were vested in the group, while individuals enjoy 
the right of occupancy only for subsistence purposes. This type of tenure exists in areas 
that have not yet been transferred or alienated through registration. It is administered 
under the Trust Land Act of 1965, which deals with all trust land. Customary land tenure 
and land law have been systematically misinterpreted - even undermined - by the judiciary 
and ignored by legislatures. Contempt for this system dates back to the pre-independence 
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era. Even before the Swynnerton Plan defined systematic procedures for the conversion 
of customary tenure into individual freeholds, official policy always contemplated the 
ultimate disappearance of that system. The current official policy of the Kenya 
Government is still the extinguishment of customary tenure through systematic 
adjudication of rights and registration of title, and its replacement with a system akin to 
the English freehold (Okoth-Ogendo, 1999). 
Public land 
Public land comprises all land currently held as unalienated government land except 
such land within the Coast Province that became Government Land through the application 
of the Land Titles Act (Cap 282). It is administered under the government Lands Act of 
1965. It also includes all land used or occupied by any ministry, department or agency of 
the government or a statutory corporation and all public roads and access roads as defined 
in the Public Roads and Roads of Access Act (Cap 399), all rivers, lakes, the territorial 
sea and the seabed, and the reversionary interest in all government freehold and leasehold 
titles. 
Problems with present titling process 
Although all the land ownership systems and land laws discussed above exist in Kenya 
today, the Registered Land Act (Cap 300) is the dominating legal instrument that governs 
land. All land previously held under the customary law system is being converted to 
registered land. Virtually all post-independence policy documents and plans have 
underlined the government's commitment to getting all land registered under the 
Registered Land Act. The acts of parliament that deal with registration of deeds in Kenya 
are Registration of Documents Act (Cap 285,1902), the Land Titles Act (Cap 282,1908) 
and the Government Lands Act (Cap 280). These laws have given way to the Registration 
of Titles Act (Cap 281) and the Registered Land Act (Cap 300) (Odhiambo and Nyangito, 
2002). 
Land administration and registration systems are fraught with stringent bureaucratic 
procedures and inefficiencies. The Registration of Titles Act, for example, has a number 
of problems that make its administration difficult: the Act is not foolproof and registration 
has occasionally been done outside the provisions of the Act. Additionally, the requirement 
that a gazette notice be issued whenever a provisional certificate of registration of title is 
issued defeats the purpose of gazzettement (Odhiambo and Nyangito, 2002). The "Njonjo 
Commission" report also notes that there are too many registration acts and very little 
attempt has been made to convert titles to the Registered Lands Act, while the same acts 
have been abused to deprive people of their property. The report further argues that the 
Land Registries staff and registrars are inefficient and there is too much corruption and 
too little supervision. It recommends that Government Lands Act (Cap 280), Registration 
of Titles Act (Cap 281), Land Titles Act (Cap 282) and Registration of Documents Act 
(Cap 285) registries be decentralized through converting titles to Registered Lands Act. 
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Furthermore, there is need to harmonize conflicting Acts. Currently, the physical planning 
Act of 1996 conflicts with the Government Lands Act (Cap 280) and the Land Control 
Act (Cap 302). Land surveys are also inhibited by poor quality staff, inaccurate and 
outdated maps, and high survey costs, implying a need to review the Survey Act. There 
is therefore clear need to review land laws and procedures in order to streamline land 
registration and issuance of titles in Kenya (Odhiambo and Nyangito, 2002). In addition, 
there is urgent need for proper coordination of various government departments dealing 
with land issues. 
The national land policy 
Kenya today, just as at independence, lacks a clearly defined or codified national land policy for adequately addressing important land issues. Land administration 
and management operate on the basis of an outdated legal framework (Ministry of Lands 
and Settlement, 2004). Odhiambo and Nyangito (2002) argue that a glaring gap in the 
Constitution of Kenya as far as land is concerned is the absence of guiding principles on 
land not classified under trust land. Issues of land tenure and management are therefore 
regulated by a large number of ordinary laws without a guiding constitutional philosophy. 
These laws have generated a multiplicity of normative, institutional and policy conflicts 
and have hindered the emergence of a clear land policy in Kenya. 
Recognition of these problems led to the appointment of the Njonjo Commission of 
inquiry into existing land laws and tenure systems in 1999. The findings of the commission, 
together with recommendations of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC, 
2004) have pointed to the need for a comprehensive framework for use, access and 
conservation of land in Kenya. 
The proposed National Land Policy process is geared towards clear definition and 
determination of the following core issues: Insecure land tenure, poor land administration, 
weak and/or ineffective mechanisms for fair, timely, affordable, transparent and accessible 
resolution of land disputes, continued land fragmentation, and the multiplicity of tenure 
regimes with limited harmonization (Ministry of Lands and Settlement, 2004; Adams, 
2003). In particular, the overall objective of land policy should be to establish a land 
administration and management system that is economically efficient, socially equitable, 
environmentally sustainable and operationally accountable to the Kenyan people. The 
Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements and the Habitat Agenda (1996) is expected 
to provide the international policy and legal context for the human settlements component 
of the National Land Policy for Kenya. 
The discussion in this section shows that the government is committed towards 
individualization of customary land in Kenya. This facilitates land purchases, sales and 
transfers. However, the system is fraught with institutional rigidities that make land 
marketing procedures lengthy and cumbersome. Efficiency in the land market depends 
on government providing an enabling framework and performing the necessary regulatory 
and administrative functions effectively and efficiently (Adams, 2003). The proposed 
national land policy is expected to reduce the bottlenecks in land marketing, quicken 
land transfers and thus encourage long-term investments in land improvements. 
3. Study site and the socioeconomic setting 
he study is based on Kajiado District, in the southern part of Rift Valley Province, 
Kenya. The district covers an area of 21,105 square kilometres. The rainfall pattern 
is bimodal, with the short rains falling between October and December and the 
long rains between March and May. The rainfall is quite unreliable and is influenced by 
altitude. Regions with a high elevation have the highest average rainfall (1,250mm), 
while most of the district (low elevation) records an average annual rainfall of about 
500mm (Republic of Kenya, 1997). The soils are of low to moderate fertility and make 
the ecosystem fragile and easily degradable. The district spans a range of agro-ecological 
zones (based on differences in soil quality, rainfall variability, altitude and vegetation): a 
semi-humid climate that supports mixed agriculture, an arable semi-humid/semi-arid 
climate and an arid climate, favourable mainly for ranching and pastoral activities. 
Although the district largely supports livestock and wildlife, there is also significant 
crop farming in the area. 
The study uses both primary and secondary panel data. The primary data were collected 
from a cross section of households in Kajiado district over the period March 1999 to 
May 2000 in three phases. The first phase corresponded with the long rains (March-May 
1999), the second phase with the short rains (October-December 1999) and the third 
phase with the long rains (March-May 2000). The National Sample Survey and Evaluation 
Programme of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National 
Development (Republic of Kenya, 1996), was used as the sampling frame for the field 
survey. A self-weighting probability sample of 570 farming households over the three 
time periods was chosen from the national sampling frame in Kajiado district and a 
detailed questionnaire used to collect the data. The questionnaire was designed to collect 
information regarding economic and demographic characteristics of sampled households, 
land conservation practices, and land use rights, among other covariates of interest. To 
these data we append data on population density at the cluster level from the population 
census. 
The secondary data for the study concerning the quantity of biomass at the village 
level were obtained from the Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing 
(DRSRS), Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and Wildlife. These data are 
derived from satellite images and vegetation indexes collected by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (a US-government body), and translated into biomass 
in kilograms per acre of land in village clusters by the DRSRS. We used the data in the 
same form that we received them from the DRSRS. 
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The Maasai, settlement history and birth of privatization 
T'7~ ajiado District is predominantly occupied by the Maasai as the indigenous tribe, 
although migration and intermarriage has increased the proportion of other tribes 
considerably over the last four decades. Population census reports indicate that the 
proportion of pure Maasai in the district declined from 69% in 1969 to 57% in 1989 
(Table 1). The current proportion is not known, but one can infer from previous statistics 
that the Maasai population in the district is becoming increasingly smaller.1 
Table 1: Kajiado District population by major tribe, 1969-1989 
Tribe 1969 1979 1989 
Number % Number % Number % 
Maasai 58,961 68.64 93,560 62.79 146,268 56.55 
Kikuyu 16,258 18.93 33,630 22.57 61,446 23.76 
Kamba 4,321 5.03 8,798 5.90 20,755 8.02 
Luyha 1,166 1.36 2,280 1.53 5,416 2.09 
Luo 1,612 1.88 3,174 2.13 8,084 3.13 
Tanzanian 1,280 1.49 2,194 1.47 4,425 1.71 
Other tribes 2,305 2.68 5,369 3.60 12,265 4.74 
Total 85,903 100 149,005 100 258,659 100 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Population and Housing Census Reports, various issues. 
The Maasai are traditionally pastoral nomads who like other East African pastoralists 
move their livestock in response to erratic rainfall conditions to maximize herd size, 
milk yields and meat production for human consumption. Traditional subsistence 
pastoi alism revolved around optimizing stock losses to drought, disease, predation and 
raiding. In Kenya the Maasai are concentrated in Kajiado and Narok districts of Rift 
Valley Province. They are bordered by agro-pastoralists to the west (Kalenjin) and 
agricultural Bantu tribes in most other directions. 
The Maasai keep livestock breeds that are adapted to the arid savannas and vary the 
species mix, choosing among cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys and camels. They also 
selectively breed within individual species, move seasonally, and adjust daily for aging 
regimes and herd size to optimize foraging in response to rainfall and local pasture 
conditions. Flexibility and mobility of stock grazing and herding are priority, in both 
space and time, to reduce environmental degradation. Mobility is an effective tool for 
range improvement as it provides the herder flexibility to modify herds and access 
alternative pasture areas relative to sedentary livestock production (Kabubo-Mariara, 
2003). 
The Maasai experienced a period of aggressive expansion in the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century, co-existing peacefully with their agriculturally oriented 
neighbours with whom they engaged in trade and intermarriages. In the 1880s and 1890s, 
livestock diseases seriously affected livestock holdings, while at the same time a lot of 
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Maasai succumbed to a smallpox epidemic. These tragedies left the Maasai unusually 
vulnerable and they were soon compelled to sign land agreements with the British 
resulting in the loss of between 50% and 70% of the land they once utilized, more so 
their best grazing and drought refuges (Western and Nightingale, 2002). Displaced by 
colonial settlers and a growing population, many moved illegally onto the wetter northern 
regions and settled in present day Kajiado and Narok districts (Rutten, 1992). 
The lack of permanent settlements and land ownership made the Maasai easier victims 
of land snatches than the farming communities surrounding them (Kikuyu, Kamba and 
Chagga). The appropriation of wetter areas and water sources by these communities 
aggravated by the loss of drought refuges to national parks (Amboseli and Chyulus). put 
more pressure on subsistence herders, increasing their vulnerability to ecological change 
and drought. In response to this predicament, privatization of land entered the Miuisai 
consciousness and they started agitating for the same. In the early 1950s, the colonial 
government granted privatization rights in favour of group ranches rather than individual 
ownership. Privatization later received a boost from the Lawrence Report commissioned 
by the government to assess the potential of privatization (Lawrence at al., 1966) and 
also through the World Bank funding of water supply and dipping facilities (Kituyi, 
1990). 
Group ranches lacked ecological viability, however, because a single ranch did not 
have dry and wet season pasture that would ensure year-long herd survival. Lack of 
flexibility and mobility increased mortality of herds and lowered Maasai self-sufficiency. 
The concentration of livestock within fixed boundaries was also bound to increase 
environmental degradation (Kabubo-Mariara, 2003). The group ranch concept failed to 
meet its stated objectives and also jeopardized the socioeconomic and cultural welfare of 
the Maasai (Kituyi, 1990). Some of the ranches disintegrated into small plots unable lo 
sustain cattle and Maasai families through dry seasons and droughts. 
Because of this failure, a growing trend of privatization towards individual land titles 
intensified in the early 1970s. Young and educated Maasai were enthusiastic to secure 
land title in order to improve rangeland facilities and join the market economy through 
beef production. But many Maasai received land titles only to quickly sell out to Kikuyu 
agriculturalists and move on to look for wage employment in cities and towns. With 
restricted movements and further fragmentation occasioned by population growth, 
pastoralism has continued to be unsustainable and the Maasai can no longer rely entirely 
on their herds for subsistence. 
Economic diversification and origins of crop farming 
The unsustainability of pastoralism and the growing vulnerability of the Maasai called for flexible range practices, strong social networks and livelihood diversification 
strategies (Kabubo-Mariara, 2005). Arable farming, wage employment and diversification 
of livestock production are the main responses to environmental threat and these have 
increased incomes and reduced drought vulnerability. Other responses include the 
emergence of Maasai non-government and community-based organizations, aimed at 
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securing rights, raising financial assistance, building local capacity and opening up new 
opportunities. The diversification of lifestyles and livelihoods among the more progressive 
Maasai and competition from more entrepreneurial immigrants creates greater hardships 
for those who remain rooted in subsistence pastoralism and has created deep inequalities 
among the Maasai (Western and Nightingale, 2002). Farming was slowly adopted from 
the Kikuyu, Kamba and Chagga tribes. These immigrants dominated the early phase by 
buying and leasing land, but the Maasai increasingly took up cultivation of their own 
farms in the 1980s and 1990s, more so where they border and/or inter-marry with their 
agro-pastoral or agricultural neighbours. As a consequence, the Maasai continue to adopt 
a more sedentary way of life, with a rise in permanent villages, which is evidenced by a 
rise in occupied manyattas, grass thatched and tin roofed houses. Seasonal migration has 
also become almost entirely restricted to movement of animals by male herders who 
leave their families behind to take care of the farm (Kabubo-Mariara, 2005). 
Settlement and the spread of small-scale farms began in the wetter elevated regions 
north and south of the district, and then spread along the rivers and into the swamps. 
Marginal farms also spread along the Loitoktok-Sultan Hamud pipeline during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Most areas with arable potential had been settled by the late 1980s. 
Today, the main farming zones include more arable elevated areas of Ngong, Loitoktok 
and Magadi division and more marginal farms in Mashuru, Central and Namanga 
divisions. In the more arable areas, crop production has slowly evolved and ranges from 
traditional subsistence farming to irrigation farming and market production. Irrigation is 
concentrated in Loitoktok division drawing water from the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro, 
and in the Ngurumani escarpment, where there is a concentration of vegetable and fruit 
farming for the export market. In the more arid areas, new crop varieties that can withstand 
rangeland weather problems facilitate cultivation. In particular, the introduction of 
katumani maize, a drought resistant and quick-ripening variety suitable for areas with 
short rain seasons, has been the most important innovation. In the past, wheat and barley 
farming took place under commercial holding in northern Kajiado. Crop farming in the 
district is inhibited by ecological problems including limited soil moisture, unpredictability 
of rains, pressure on pasture resources and labour resources among other factors. 
Given the increasing importance of crop cultivation in the district, soil and land 
conservation is a priority to ensure sustainability of agricultural production and the 
environment. This calls for urgent study of the dynamics and determinants of land 
conservation in the district and how changing property rights have affected land and 
land conservation. This study attempts to fill this research gap. 
4. Literature review 
his section presents a short survey of previous research on the determinants of 
land conservation investments. We confine the review of literature to developing 
countries, mostly African, but include some relatively new and relevant studies 
from China. First we review literature on relationships between land rights and investment 
in land conservation, then move to other determinants of such investments. 
A small but increasing number of studies have investigated the impact of land rights 
on investment in environmental conservation (land improvements) in developing 
countries, but interest in the role of property rights only emerged in the 1980s. Prior to 
this, focus had been concentrated on developed countries with well specified property 
rights (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). Place and Swallow (2000) note that such studies 
are complicated in several aspects. First, there are challenges in defining and measuring 
property rights and tenure security. Second, there are numerous difficult theoretical and 
empirical issues involved in such studies, particularly in defining technology, identifying 
key dimensions of property rights and accounting for the endogenous determination of 
property rights. While a number of studies have treated property rights as endogenous 
following Boserup's (1965) work, and attempted to control for possible endogeneity 
(Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002; Jacoby et al., 2002), other studies have argued that 
property rights could indeed be exogenous (Udry, 2003; Platteau, 1996,2000; Goldstein 
and Udry, 2002; Quisumbing et al., 2001; Place and Otsuka, 2000; Kabubo-Mariara, 
2005). Third, researchers have different reasons for undertaking studies of the relationship 
between property rights and technology adoption and each reason may have different 
implications for methodology. 
To date, there is no consensus on the impact of tenure security on investment in land 
improvements. Debate on the role of property rights reveals two major schools of thought. 
Some studies concur that systematic land rights through land titling are not important for 
investments in land improvements. Where tenure security is defined in terms of bundles 
of transfer rights or possession of title, the correlation between security and investments 
has been found to be weak (Migot-Adholla, Place and Oluoch-Kosura, 1994; Migot-
Adholla, Hazell, Blarel and Place, 1991; Place and Hazell, 1993; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 
1994). The other strand of literature argues that land rights are important for investments. 
Substantial theoretical literature advocates for privatization of land on the premise that 
farmers' incentives to invest in technologies are inhibited by weak tenure security arising 
from indigenous property rights institutions and by lack of land titles, which hinders 
their capacity to obtain credit to make investments (Feder et al., 1988; Shiferaw and 
Holden, 1999). However, a few other studies suggest that highly individualized rights to 
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land are more important for long-term than for short-term investments (Place and Otsuka, 
2000; Place and Swallow, 2000; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). Other studies cast 
doubt on any linkage between land title and agricultural investment (McCulloch et al., 
19W). 
We note here that part of the reason for different findings is the definition of land 
rights and methodological approaches used. Most studies focus on security of tenure 
rather than transferability. A number of authors have used binary dummies to capture 
security (such as having a land title, as in Feder et al., 1988; Roth et al., 1994; Pinckney 
and Kimuyu, 1994; Migot-Adholla et al., 1994; Shiferaw and Holden, 1999; Place and 
Otsuka, 2002), while other studies have taken a continuum of rights (such as right to sell, 
right to bequeath and so on, as in Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). Others have focused 
on the mode of land acquisition (such as purchased, borrowed or gift, alaBrasselle et al., 
2002; Otsuka et al., 2003; Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996). 
Place and Swallow (2000) argue that the impact of property rights on adoption of 
investment technologies will depend on three important dimensions of property rights: 
exclusivity, security and transferability. The degree of exclusivity has a positive effect 
on the incentive to produce, invest and adopt technology, more so those technologies 
that are fixed to the land. This supports Baland and Platteau (1996) who suggest that less 
exclusive land rights could help people to pool the risks associated with new innovations 
or technologies. Insecurity increases the relative price of long-term assets to land and 
thus reduces the capital intensity of farming. Restrictions on transferability could reduce 
the incentives of current residents to adopt long-term technologies, reduce the market 
exchange of land, and thus affect the efficiency of land allocation or even the possible 
use of land as collateral (Place and Swallow 2000). 
Migot-Adholla, Place and Oluoch-Kosura (1994) and Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel 
anil Place (1991), after controlling for other possible effects, concluded that neither land 
ri glits nor land title were related to investment in land improvements in Kenya. Only in 
some regions in Rwanda and Ghana were land improvements shown to be highly 
associated with security of tenure. Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) found land reform to be 
unimportant and indigenous tenure to be secure enough to favour increased long-term 
investments (coffee planting) in Kenya and Tanzania. Place and Otsuka (2000) found 
tenure security to be linked to land use and tree-cover change in Uganda and Malawi, 
although they argue that population pressure rather than tenure is the key driving force 
for land use change. Place and Otsuka (2002), using individual rights to give land without 
permission as an indicator of appropriate current land rights, decided that tenure was an 
insignificant determinant of coffee adoption in Uganda. Their study further shows that 
coffee planting enhances security of tenure, particularly under customary tenure, and 
that fallowing and tree planting are less common on customary land than on parcels 
where land rights are relatively stronger and more stable. Otsuka et al. (2003) argue that 
while the strength of ex ante land rights would have a positive effect on tree planting, its 
effect is not of overwhelming importance. Their study supports Place and Otsuka (2002) 
in that they also find evidence of some inefficiency of land use under customary land 
tenure systems. 
1 4 RESEARCH PAPGF, 1 5 3 
Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) suggest that no significant differences exist in farmer's 
investment behaviour when land is owned individually and when the land is communally 
owned. Roth, Cochrane and Kisamba-Mugerwa (1994) and Roth, Unruh and Barrows 
(1994) determined that the effect of land title on various types of agricultural investment 
was insignificant in Somalia. They also found that registration in Uganda was significantly 
and positively related to investment in fencing, use of manure and mulching, but appeared 
to have little effect on long-term investments. Besley (1995) showed that better land 
rights facilitated investments in some regions of Ghana and not in other regions. His 
results seem to contradict results obtained for the same regions by Migot-Adholla, Place 
and Oluoch-Kosura (1994) and Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel and Place (1991). Brasselle 
et al. (2002) indicates that controlling for the endogeneity bias between land rights and 
investments, increased land rights do not appear to stimulate investment. 
Deininger and Jin (2002) used evidence from China to demonstrate that greater tenure 
security, especially if combined with transferability of land, had a positive impact on 
agricultural land investments. They further show that households' support for more secure 
property rights is increased by their access to other insurance mechanisms, suggesting 
that land plays an important role as a safety net. In an analysis of land rights and farmer 
investment incentives, Li et al. (1998) provide evidence that land tenure and associated 
property rights in rural China affect the production behaviour of farmers. They found 
that long-term use rights encourage the use of land-saving investments but do not affect 
the incentive of farmers to use short-term current inputs. In a study examining the risk of 
land expropriation as a constraint on farm investment, Jacoby et al. (2002) provide support 
for the view that heightened expropriation risks dampen investments in rural China. The 
authors conclude that although high expropriation risk reduces application of organic 
relative to chemical fertilizers, welfare analysis reveal that guaranteeing land tenure would 
yield only minimal efficiency gains. 
Although studies on investment in soil management focus mostly on the impact of 
land rights, other factors are also investigated. For example, Somda et al. (2002) suggest 
that in Burkina Faso farmers' socioeconomic characteristics and agro-ecological location 
significantly affect their adoption decisions. The authors also found annual agricultural 
incomes and number of ruminants to be important. Shiferaw and Holden (1999) found 
lack of technology, poverty and high rates of time preference to undermine investments 
in land improvements. In a related study, the same authors argue that lack of low-cost 
technologies that would provide short-term benefits to farmers hinders investment in 
conservation practices (Shiferaw and Holden, 2001). Place and Otsuka (2002) find farm 
size, length of time since the parcel was acquired, soil fertility status, age of household 
head, family size and distance from a paved road to be important determinants of adoption 
of various land improvements. This study supports their earlier findings for Uganda and 
Malawi, which show that infrastructural policy (connection to markets and availability 
of good roads) are correlated with land improvements (Place and Otsuka, 2000). Jacoby 
et al. (2002) also conclude that household characteristics are important determinants of 
the adoption of land improving investments. This finding is supported by Deininger and 
Jin (2002), who say family size, especially the presence of more adults, and per capita 
land holding have a positive impact on investments. 
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Income and the number of adults in a household positively influence investments, 
according to Brasselle et al. (2002). The impact of family size on incentives to invest in 
land improvements supports Tiffen et al. (1994), who use evidence from Kenya to 
demonstrate that growing population, in association with market developments, generates 
new technologies that support increased productivity and improved conservation of land 
and water resources. The impact of population variables on investment is supported by 
Place and Otsuka (2000) using evidence from Uganda (see also Boserup, 1965), while 
the impact of incomes and assets is supported by Somda et al. (2002), Li et al. (1998), 
and Alemu (1999). McCulloch et al. (1998) argue that wealth expands households' options 
to acquire and use technologies, especially those that require the outlay of considerable 
resources, in the absence of readily available financial markets. Gebremedhin and Swinton 
(2003) use evidence from Ethiopia to show that the opportunity cost of labour, market 
access and forgone land productivity are strong determinants of level of investment in 
land conservation but make no significant contribution to the choice of whether to invest 
or not. Other factors include credit, environmental and price risks, agro-ecological 
conditions, and cultural factors. Access to appropriate physical, economic and information 
infrastructure, as well as diffusion of information are also critical determinants of 
conservation technology choice (McCulloch et al. 1998). 
From the foregoing literature review, it is clear that there is growing research interest 
in the impact of land rights and tenure security on investment in environmental 
conservation. While a lot of work has been done in some Eastern African countries, 
namely Uganda and Ethiopia, there is paucity of recent work on Kenya, although a number 
of studies were carried out a decade ago (Tiffen et al., 1994; Migot-Adholla, Place and 
Oluoch-Kosura, 1994; Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel and Place, 1991; Pinckney and 
Kimuyu, 1994). Recent studies in Ethiopia and Uganda have been made possible by the 
availability of data from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) research 
programme. This study builds on the few existing studies in Kenya and explores the 
impact of land rights and other factors on adoption of land conservation practices. By 
bridging this research gap, this study makes an important contribution to the literature 
and to the database on environmental conservation practices. 
5. Methodology 
his study assesses the impact of land rights institutions, among other factors, on 
the adoption of land conservation practices. From the previous literature, we 
hypothesize that land rights affect investment incentives as they determine the 
expected returns to investments for those who actually invest (Besley, 1995). As indicated 
earlier, some studies have treated property rights as endogenous, following the works of 
Boserup (1965) and supported by empirical evidence (see Platteau, 2000). According to 
Boserup, as a population grows, land and other natural resources become scarcer relative 
to labour and access to markets improves. As a result, agricultural intensification occurs, 
relative prices change and food prices increase as demand for food rises. This process 
induces institutional innovations such as private property rights, which then facilitate 
adoption of better technologies that help to stave off the operation of diminishing returns 
in natural resource use. 2 The same premise is held by the evolutionary land rights theory 
(Platteau, 1996, 2000). 3 Drawing from Boserup's work, Platteau makes a convincing 
case that population density relative to land abundance is the place to begin to understand 
the evolution of property rights. 
A number of econometric approaches have been used to estimate the impact of land 
rights on investment in land improvements. Where there are feedback effects between 
property rights and technology adoption, a simultaneous equation model would be 
appropriate for estimation. If the two variables are continuous, a three-stage least squares 
estimation method could be used, but this is rarely the case (Place and Swallow, 2000). 
For limited dependent variables, single equation models for handling endogeneity have 
been utilized and bootstrapping techniques employed to correct for the resulting biases 
in estimated errors of coefficients (Brasselle et al. 2002; Baland et al., 1999). 
Owing to the paucity of exogenous variables that can be used as instruments and also 
because of the qualitative and sometimes unobserved nature of the land rights, it is 
normally difficult to apply the simultaneous equation estimation methods to land rights 
and adoption of land conservation technologies. For this reason, most studies estimate 
reduced form functions explaining the incidence of the observed technologies as a function 
of dummy variables representing land rights, often considered as pre-determined with 
respect to the "adoption decision (Otsuka et al., 2003; Place and Otsuka, 2000; Place and 
Swallow, 2000; Goldstein and Udry, 2002). 
Following this approach, we propose to use a specification where the adoption of land conservation practices (Y) is assumed to be a linear function of the expected land rights (R e), as in Otsuka et al. (2003): 
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where OC0 and AI are parameters and Y is measured as a binary variable equal to 1 if 
any practice was adopted, otherwise equal to 0. We expect a x to be positive as stronger 
expected land rights increase expected future returns (Otsuka et al., 2003). The expected 
land rights (RE) is not directly observable because it could be affected by land conservation 
technologies ( Y ) and the specific right held by an individual (Z) (See also Besley, 1995; 
Braselle et al., 2002; Jacoby et al., 2002.) The expected land rights can therefore be 
specified as in the following linear function: 
R ^ + P . Y + P j Z (2) 
where /?o refers to expected impact of land rights with no conservation technologies, 
represents the marginal effect of adoption of a given conservation technology on land 
rights, and /32 measures the difference in specific land rights held by individuals. From 
available literature, it can be assumed that /3y could be positive as land rights are shown 
to be increased by adoption of conservation practices. In a situation where Y has no 
impact on RE, /3; would be zero and it can be shown that land tenure institutions affect 
adoption of land conserving technologies through their effect on land rights (Otsuka et 
al., 2003). 
Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 1 and rearranging terms would yield the 
following reduced form function: 
Y= t 0 + t j Z (3) 
where / , is the marginal effect of various land rights on the adoption of conservation 
technologies. If we let £ to be a vector of all other variables influencing adoption of land 
conservation practices, then Equation 3 becomes: 
Y ^ O + ^ Z + ^ + H. (4) 
where [ l l is a random error term. 
In compact panel data form, the estimable variant of Equation 4 can be expressed as: 
Y= OCQ + XJT(3+ V. + ejt (5) 
where j denotes the j'h household; t denotes the time period (t= 1,2,3), Y. is the 
probability that household j adopts a given land conservation measure at time t, a is a 
constant term and j3 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. X is a vector of determinants of adoption of conservation measures specific to household j at time t; v. + 
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£ i s the residual where v. is the household specific residual, which differs amon« J J C 
households but is constant for any household over time; e. tis white noise with the usual 
properties (mean zero, uncorrelated with itself, uncorrected with X, uncorrected with v., 
and homoscedastic). 
Following standard practice in current literature (see, for example, Gebremedhin anil 
Swinton 2003; Otsuka et al., 2003; Besley, 1995; Braselle et al., 2002), our empirical 
approach is to estimate Equation 4 using a continuum of rights (Z) as proxies for security 
of tenure which could be viewed as a proxy for institutional factors in investment risk. 
We experiment with up to five dummy variables, including right to sell land, right to 
bequeath land, full ownership right, land belonging to a group ranch and tenancy rights. 
The first three dummies are indicators of longer-term tenure security, while the last two 
rights are measures of short-term tenure security. We further compare models with these 
dummies to models with a binary variable for formal land rights. 4 
From the literature review, in addition to land rights, the adoption of conservation 
technologies is also a function of a vector of other determinants ( £ ) , which include 
household characteristics (age, gender, marital status and level of education of the 
household head), prices and productivity variables. Prices are determined by relative 
factor endowments and market access. In the literature, prices have been captured by 
population density and distance to markets where actual price data are not available. On 
the basis of previous studies, we expect population density to encourage adoption of 
land conservation, owing to land scarcity. Distance to markets is taken as a proxy for 
return on investment factors and the impact is ambiguous because longer distance reduces 
both crop income and off-farm work opportunities during the dry season. Productivity is 
captured by the division in which a household is located, which reflects the agro-ecological 
zone (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003; Place and Otsuka, 2000, 2002; Somda et ah, 
2002; Deininger and Jin, 2002; Li et al., 1998; McCulloch et al., 1998). We expect farmers 
in more favourable agro-ecological zones to have a higher likelihood of adopting land 
conservation. Highland zones and villages in more elevated areas tend to suffer more 
erosion and thus should benefit more from soil conservation (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 
2003). 
Endowment of labour, land and other wealth indicators are also hypothesized to 
influence conservation. Family labour proxied by the number of adults would be expected 
to encourage investment because of the availability of workers, or the presence of more 
mouths to feed. Land, income and livestock (cattle and small ruminants) would be expected 
to have an ambiguous impact. For example, more land and livestock are indicators of 
more wealth and capacity and should encourage investment. On the other hand, more 
land could lead to extensive rather than intensive farming, while more livestock may 
make owners less dependent on crop farming and therefore reduce the probability of 
conserving the environment. 
The study analyses the adoption of three different land conservation practices: blocking 
soil erosion outlets (commonly known as soil bunds in the literature), terracing, and 
planting drought resistant vegetation and trees. The three measures offer contrasts in 
length of investments and effectiveness of erosion abatement (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 
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2003). Soil bunds are more long-term measures than terracing, but the latter may require 
more time and inputs. Planting drought resistant vegetation and trees is labour intensive 
but attractive because most of the vegetation also doubles as livestock fodder. 
Equation 4 can be estimated using probit or logit procedures to capture the impact of 
land rights and other variables on each specific conservation measure. In this paper, we 
estimate Equation 5 using a pooled data set. Alternatively, the multinomial logit model 
can be used where the three practices are assumed to be mutually exclusive and where 
the panel data are pooled to form cross-section data. We use panel data models as they 
yield better results than cross-sectional models, since the former control for unobserved 
heterogeneity due to farmer specific factors and are based on more informative data; 
they also give more variability, less collinearity among the variables and more efficient 
results. However, we run a series of random effects regressions and also pool the data to 
run a multinomial logit model of adoption of land conservation practices. We first run 
the regressions with a continuum of dummies for tenure security and compare the results 
with regressions with a binary dummy variable for tenure security. 
6. Results 
To ensure adequate representation and coverage of the district, information on all the six administrative divisions of the study district were collected as displayed in Table 2. The differences in sample sizes reflect differences in population density 
in the district. Considering variations in soil quality, rainfall, terrain and vegetation, these 
administrative divisions are also good proxies for the agro-ecological zones in the district 
(Kabubo-Mariara, 2005). 
Table 2: Sample sizes by division and data collection phase 
Division Phase 1 Phase II Phase III All phases 
Loitoktok 29.12 29.47 28.36 29 
Mashuru 16.19 13.28 14.01 14.54 
Magadi 8.42 9.39 10.4 9.36 
Ngong 21.42 23.89 22.99 22.74 
Central 13.14 11.6 12.75 12.5 
Namanga 11.69 12.37 11.49 11.86 
Total 1,377 1,310 1,192 3,879 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
The key characteristics for the entire sample are presented in Table 3. We note from 
the table that the total number of observations amounted to 3,879 individuals from the 
three phases of fieldwork. The difference in number of observations is partly attributed 
to sample attrition over the three time periods, the prolonged drought, which led to a lot 
of migration, and the differences in household size. Important highlights from this table 
include the large household size with the largest being polygamous households. We also 
note that the overall mean household size in our sample (9.4) is twice as high as the mean 
household size for the entire district and for Kenya at 4.8 and 4.6, respectively. In the 
empirical analysis, we use population density rather than household size, which is arguably 
endogenous. Another important issue to note is illiteracy, with about half of the respondents 
(49%) having no schooling at all, and a very low mean (3.2) number of years in school. 
In the empirical implementation, we generate three dummies to capture the level of 
education, primary education (31%), secondary education (17%) and post secondary 
schooling (3%), relative to no education at all (49%). 
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Table 3: Key household characteristics 
2 1 
Variable Phase I Phase II Phase III All phases 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
dev. dev. dev. dev. 
Age (years) 19.7 17.0 20.1 17.5 19.6 17.1 19.8 17.2 
Male (percentage) 47 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 
Household size (number) 9.3 5.9 9.6 6.7 9.2 5.3 9.4 6 
Married (percentage) 73 44 69 47 67 47 69 46 
Can read and write (percentage) 51 50 56 50 49 50 52 50 
Ever attended school (percentage) 50 50 55 50 50 50 52 50 
Number of years in school 3.7 4.3 3.0 4.0 2.8 4.0 3.2 4.1 
Number of observations 1,377 1,310 1,192 3,879 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
We base the empirical analysis on the sample of household adults aged 18 years and 
above, amounting to a pool of 1,600 observations. 5 A summary of the key variables used 
is presented in Appendix Table A1. Adoption of land conservation practices is one key 
variable of interest. In total about 39% of all farmers had undertaken some form of land 
improving investment. Of the three main types of land improving investments, 19% of 
all farmers planted drought resistant vegetation and trees, 8% constructed soil bunds 
and 8% built terraces. We note that 49% of private property holders had invested in at 
least one land improvement, compared with only 27% of their common property holding 
counterparts. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Land rights are other key determinants of land conservation practices used by farmers. 
Broadly speaking, about 73% of all farmers in the sample held land under private property 
arrangements (with formal titles) and 27% under group ranches. However, we 
disaggregated these to measure the strength of land rights held by individual farmers. 
We examined the data further to check whether respondents had the right to sell land, 
bequeath to children or lease out to tenants, whether the land belonged to a group ranch, 
and last whether the respondent was a tenant. Tenancy is the weakest form of land right, 
followed by scheme membership. However, a respondent who can sell land (the strongest 
right) would also have the right to bequeath and to lease out land to tenants (Otsuka et 
al., 2003). Only 7% of the respondents held land under tenancy arrangements. 
Household assets are proxied by a number of variables: amount of land and livestock 
owned, transfers received by the household, and rent incomes. Land ownership in the 
study district is highly unequal (Appendix Table Al) . The Gini index with respect to 
land ownership is estimated at 0.66 compared with a Theil index of 0.81. Inequality in 
land ownership is highest in Ngong division with a Gini Index of 0.77 and lowest in 
Central with a Gini index of only 0.32. A lot of inequality is also observed in livestock 
ownership, with reported cattle owned yielding a mean herd size of 29 head of cattle 
(standard deviation of 87), and small ruminants with a mean of 60 (standard deviation of 
149). Inequality measures for livestock ownership are much higher than for land 
ownership, with a district Gini index for total livestock units of 0.75. The index is highest 
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for Loitoktok (0.82) and lowest in Magadi (0.56). The same trend is evident for income 
flows (transfers and rent incomes). 
Appendix Table 1 further indicates inaccessibility of markets and water in the study 
district, implied by long distances to markets (12 kilometres) and to the usual sources of 
water (3.5 kilometres). 
Population, property rights and land conservation 
The population density in Kajiado District has grown steadily over time, mostly due to immigration. Results of Kenya's population census estimates that the population 
density has increased from 5 persons per square kilometre in 1969 to about 22 persons 
per square kilometre in 1999 (Table 4). 6 We note that Ngong division has consistently 
reported the highest population densities over time, partly due to better agro-climate 
conditions largely influenced by the presence of Ngong Hills and partly due to the 
proximity of some parts of the division to Nairobi. These two factors also account for the 
large variations in population density in the division. 
Table 4: Population density by division: 1969-1999 (person/Km2) 
Division 1969 1979 1989 1999 
Loitoktok 6 7 12 15 
Mashuru 2 8 9 12 
Ngong 8 13 22 41 
Central 3 5 10 17 
Magadi 3 3 5 8 
Namanga 3 5 10 17 
District total 5 8 14 22 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Population and Housing Census Reports, various issues. 
It is important to note that the estimates in Table 4 mask a lot of disparities in population 
density in the district, with more arable areas reporting very high population densities. 
For example, in 1969, the highest population density was estimated at 101 for Ngong 
location (rural), compared with 212 for the same location in 1979. As expected, the 
urban and peri-urban clusters reported much higher densities than this. In the same year, 
the highest rural population density for Loitoktok division was 101 persons per square 
kilometre. In 1989, the population density for Ngong location alone was estimated at 
340 persons per square kilometre, but with some sub-locations reporting a density as 
high as 617. In the same census, some sub-locations of Loitoktok division reported 
population densities as high as 150 persons per square kilometre. The 1999 estimates 
give the same picture, with the density for Ngong location estimated at 369 persons per 
square kilometre, with highest reported densities of more than 3,000 persons in the peri-
urban clusters. Loitoktok, the sub-location with the highest density in 1999, had an 
estimated 197 persons per square kilometre. 
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Table 5 presents an analysis of the population densities per cluster. Here we obtained 
the estimated population densities for sampled clusters from the census reports, so that 
we can tell the population density in the cluster where a household is located. For example, 
taking into account the division in which a household is located gives us a district mean 
population density of 74 persons per square kilometre with a standard deviation of 121 
persons. 
Table 5: Population density: 1999-2000 (Person/Km2) 
Division Mean Std. deviation Min. Max. 
Loitoktok 36 20 11 76 
Mashuru 11 4 4 17 
Ngong 209 164 6 373 
Central 20 3 17 23 
Magadi 6.5 0.5 6 7 
Namanga 16 2 14 18 
District total 74 121 4 373 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
Population, conservation and property rights 
The relationships among population density, land conservation and property rights are 
the gist of Boserup's hypothesis and the evolutionary land rights theory. To test the 
Boserup hypothesis, we carry out sample mean tests for differences in population densities 
by adoption of land conservation practices. The results (Table 6) show that other than for 
terracing, population density is highest for groups of farmers adopting various land 
conservation practices compared with their counterparts not adopting. Specifically, the 
mean population density among farmers adopting construction of soil bunds is 125 persons 
per square kilometre, while the mean among those not adopting is 70 persons. For 
terracing, the mean population density for non-adopters is 77 compared with a low mean 
of 40 for adopters. The differences in mean population densities by conservation measure 
are statistically significant at all conventional levels of testing. 
Table 6: Population density by land conservation measure 
Conservation measure adopted Population density** t-statistic Pr>'t' 
Practice No practice 
Construction of soil bunds 124.52 (12.7) 69.93 (3.1) -5.02 0.00 
Terracing 40.28 (7.6) 77.28 (3.2) 3.26 0.00 
Planting vegetation and trees 94.83 (7.7) 69.79 (3.3) -3.24 0.00 
All practices 89.95 (5.5) 66.27 (3.6) -3.49 0.00 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
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Related to the Boserup hypothesis, we also test for the evolutionary land rights theory.7 
The theory can be tested through analysis of the correlation between total land owned 
and property rights, on the one hand, and population density and property rights, on the 
other. The assumption here is that as population density increases, land becomes relatively 
scarce and this drives evolution of property rights (Platteau, 1996, 2000). If property 
rights have indeed evolved endogenously in the district, then we expect that individualized 
property rights are found where land is relatively scarce. We therefore carry out sample 
mean tests to find out whether there are significant differences in total land owned under 
different property right regimes. The results do not seem to support the evolutionary 
land rights theory because it appears as though individuals own more land where there is 
individualized ownership (Appendix Table A2). For example, the mean number of acres 
owned by farmers with full ownership rights is about 110 compared with only 74 for 
farmers under common property resources. 
We also test for the evolutionary land rights theory by analysing whether there are 
significant differences in population densities under different property right regimes. 
The results for this are presented in Table 7. These results indicate that taking into account 
the population densities from 1969 to 1999, clusters with highest densities happen to be 
found where land is privatized. Furthermore, the differences are statistically significant 
at all conventional levels of significance, confirming that property rights in the district 
may be evolving endogenously as population density increases. 
Table 7: Population density by property rights dummy and year 
Year Private property Common property t-statistic Pr>t 
1969 5.4 (2.1) 4.8 (2.2) 4.8 0.00 
1979 8.6 (2.9) 7.2 (3.6) 8.2 0.00 
1989 14 (5.2) 12 (6.2) 8.5 0.00 
1999 23(11.9) 18(12.4) 4.5 0.00 
1999 88 (133) 37 (68.0) 7.6 0.00 
1999** 25 (17.0) 17 (17.7) 6.8 0.00 
* Cluster level estimates. 
** Excluding Ngong. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
Breaking the property rights further into a larger continuum of tenure measures supports 
this conclusion somewhat, though not all differences are statistically significant (Table 
8). The results indicate that the lowest population density is observed where land is still 
held under group ranches and thus is common property. We take note that the population 
density for households under tenancy rights is quite high and the results may seem 
surprising, or may be mistaken to imply the impact of peri-urban clusters where the 
population is much higher than in the pure rural clusters. We note, however, that 60% of 
farmers holding tenancy rights are located in Loitoktok divisions where they practice 
irrigation farming. The rest of the farmers holding land under tenancy are located in 
Ngong (34%) and Namanga (6%) divisions. 
LAND CONSERVATION IN KENYA: THE ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Table 8: Population density by property right regime 
2 5 
Land right to: Population density** t-statistic Po t 
Has right No right 
Sell land 78 (125) 69(113) 1.41 0.1600 
Bequeath land 84(127) 51 (98) 4.94 0.0000 
Own private land 76(124) 71 (115) 0.84 0.4027 
Scheme land 14(21) 90 (137) 10.46 0.0000 
Tenant land 103 (134) 72 (120) 2.58 0.0101 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data 
Land conservation and land property rights 
The results in Table 9 show the relationship between adoption of land practices and 
various land rights. The results indicate that except for soil bunds, farmers with more 
secure land rights are more likely to adopt soil improvements than are their counterparts 
with less secure rights. The differences are statistically significant at all conventional 
levels of significance. This conclusion is also supported by an analysis of the statistical 
significance of means for adoption of practices under a continuum of rights (Appendix 
Table A3). Table 9 shows that farmers under group ranches (schemes) and tenancy rights 
are less likely to construct soil bunds, although the difference for tenancy is not statistically 
significant. These two categories of ownership are also associated with a lower likelihood 
of adoption of terracing. Scheme members are also less likely to plant drought resistant 
vegetation and trees and to invest in any land improvement. The results therefore confirm 
that tenure security is important for investment in land improvements. 
Table 9: Land conservation practices by property right regime 
Practice Private 
property** 
Common 
property 
t-statistic Pr>t 
Construction of soil bunds 8.0 (0.27) 9.1 (0.29) 0.71 0.4783 
Terracing 9.4 (0.29) 2.6 (0.16) 4.62 0.0000 
Planting vegetation and trees 23 (0.42) 7.9 (27.1) 6.73 0.0000 
All practices 40 (0.49) 20 (0.40) 7.74 0.0000 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
Land conservation and poverty 
We define the poor as those households whose mean per capita expenditures fall below 
the current poverty line of Kshl,239. Although the 1997 welfare monitoring survey 
estimated a head-count index of only 28% for the whole district, estimates based on the 
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1999 population census data show a head-count index of 44% (Republic of Kenya, 2003). 
In this year, poverty was estimated to be highest in Magadi division (57%) and lowesi in 
Ngong division (34%) (Table 10). The poverty gap ranged between 12% and 24%, 
implying that on average every poor person in the district would need between Ksh] 49 
and Ksh297 more per month to reach the poverty line. Divisional poverty estimates are 
not available for 1997. 
Table 10: Poverty In Kajiado District, 1999 
Division Head-count index (% Poverty gap (% Number of Estimated number of 
of individuals below of poverty line) individuals (1999) poor individuals 
poverty line) census) 
(%) Std. error PG Std. error No. Std. error 
Loitoktok 50 6.45 18 3.16 84,919 47,099 5,477 
Mashuru 48 6.04 18 3.22 31,215 15,134 1,885 
Ngong 34 4.99 12 2.37 96,687 33,215 4,824 
Central 48 5.05 17 2.73 47,156 22,600 2,381 
Magadi 57 6.56 24 4.62 18,380 10,480 1,205 
Namanga 48 7.50 18 4.01 27,812 13,247 2,085 
District total 44 4.08 16 2.24 306,169 136,148 12,491 
Source: Republic of Kenya (2003). 
The figures in the table compare fairly well with estimated poverty rates from our 
own data, except for some divisions. We estimate a district head count of 42%. Tiie 
division with the highest head-count index is Magadi (62%), but the lowest head count is 
observed for Mashuru (21%). Ngong is observed to take the district average (Table 11). 
Our estimated poverty gap is lower than that estimated by Republic of Kenya (2003) and 
ranges from 7% to 22%. These estimates imply that every poor person in the district 
would need between only Ksh87 and Ksh273 more per month to reach the poverty line. 
We also analysed the level of inequality by computing Gini indexes and Theil entropy 
measures. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 11. The Gini index 
for the whole district is much lower than the Gini index for the whole country (estimated 
at 0.57). Inequality is more pronounced in Loitoktok division, but least pronounced in 
Ngong division. 
Table 11: Poverty in Kajiado District, 2000 
Division Head-count Poverty Poverty gap Gini index Theil entropy 
index gap squared index 
Loitoktok 55 22 12 0.4 0.28 
Mashuru 21 3 1 0.29 0.13 
Ngong 42 13 5 0.27 0.11 
Central 26 7 3 0.34 0.19 
Magadi 62 20 9 0.35 0.21 
Namanga 33 13 6 0.37 0.22 
District total 42 15 7 0.36 0.21 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
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To answer the question whether the poor are able to conserve, we analyse the 
differences in sample means of farmers adopting various conservation practices by their 
poverty status. Our analysis shows that except for terracing, there is no significant 
difference between the likelihood of the poor and non-poor adopting land conservation 
measures (Table 12). This implies that the poverty status as proxied by per capita 
expenditure may not be an important determinant of adoption of conservation measures. 
Table 12: Land conservation practices by poverty status 
Practice t ype Poor (%)** Nonpoor (%) 't' Statistic Pr>'t' 
Soil bunds 10(0.29) 7 (0.26) 1.57 0.0588 
Terracing 3(0.18) 11 (0.31) 5.73 0.0000 
Planting vegetation and trees 20 (0.40) 18(0.38) 1.18 0.2389 
All practices 33 (0.47) 36 (0.49) 1.29 0.1966 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
The result illustrated in Table 12 is further supported by analysis of adoption of land 
conservation practices by various measures of welfare, which suggests absence of any 
clear pattern of adoption of land conservation practices across welfare groups. First we 
divide our farmers into per capita expenditure quintiles and use these groups to investigate 
the adoption of land conservation practices. The results, presented in Table 13, suggest 
that middle income families (namely second and third quintiles) are more likely to adopt 
conservation practices than the poorest 20% and the richest 40%. 
Table 13: Land conservation by per capita income quintiles (%) 
Quintiles Soil bunds Terracing Planting vegetation 
and trees 
All practices 
1st 9.63 (0.29) 2.80 (0.17) 15.84 (0.37) 28.26 (0.45) 
2nd 10.00 (0.30) 2.81 (0.17) 24.06 (0.43) 36.88 (0.48) 
3rd 9.69 (0.29) 12.50 (0.33) 18.44 (0.39) 40.63 (0.49) 
4th 7.81 (0.27) 6.25 (0.24) 18.75 (0.30) 32.81 (0.47) 
5th 4.38 (0.20) 13.75 (0.34) 16.25 (0.37) 34.38 (0.48) 
Lr Chis(4) 10.45 (0.00) (51.58) (0.00) 8.80 (0.07) 12.11 (0.02) 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
To analyse the impact of assets on the adoption of land conservation, we construct a 
simple asset index using the principal component analysis. Owing to the paucity of asset 
variables in our data, we use only land, total livestock units and years of education. First, 
we note that the mean asset index is negative, implying that the average household in the 
sample is depleting its assets. The asset index also confirms wealth inequalities in the 
district, with a district-wide Gini index of 0.53, which ranges from a low of 0.30 in 
Magadi to a high of 0.53 in Namanga division. The results for the analysis of adoption of 
land conservation practices by asset index quintiles are presented in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Land conservation by asset index quintiles (%) 
Quintiles Soil bunds Terracing Planting vegetation All practices 
and trees 
1st 12.65(0.33) 2.78(0.16) 32.41 (0.47) 47.84(0.50) 
2nd 15.09(0.36) 2.52(0.15) 27.67(0.45) 45.28(0.49 
3rd 5.63(0.23) 6.56(0.25) 15.0(0.36) 27.19 (0.45 
4th 2.81 (0.17) 14.37(0.35) 9.69(0.30) 26.88(0.44) 
5th 5.31 (0.22) 11.88 (0.32) 8.44 (0.28) 25.62 (0.43) 
Lr Chi2(4) 47.18 (0.00) 54.07 (0.00) 99.50 (0.00) 68.26 (Q.QQ) 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
These results strongly support the conclusion from Table 13: except for soil bunds 
and terracing, adoption of land conservation practices declines with assets. Furthermore, 
the poorest 40% are more likely to plant trees and to adopt any practice than farmers 
with more assets. This could be explained by the fact that this index is constructed from 
the number of total livestock units owned and acres of land owned. Farmers with more 
non-income wealth are less likely to conserve their land, probably because of alternative 
income earning opportunities (say from herding) outside farming. The results are 
confirmed by further analysis based on land and total livestock unit quintiles (see tables 
15 and 16). 
Table 15: Land conservation by land ownership quintiles (%) 
Quintiles Soil bunds Terracing Planting vegetation All practices 
and trees 
1st 18,46 (0.39) 2.46(0.16) 20.92 (0.41) 41.85 (0.49) 
2nd 7.48 (0.26) 2.80 (0.17) 36.14(0.48) 46.42 (0.50) 
3rd 8.18 (0.27) 6.60 (0.25) 13.52 (0.34) 28.30 (0.45) 
4th 2.81 (0.17) 17.19(0.38) 15.63 (0.36) 35.63 (0.48) 
5th 4.40 (0.21) 9.12 (0.29) 6.92 (0.25) 20.44 (0.40) 
Lr Chi2(4) 58.21 (0.00) 63.06 (0.00) 99.41 (0.00) 62.98 (0.00) 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
Table 16: Land conservation by total livestock owned quintiles (%) 
Quintiles Soil bunds Terracing Planting vegetation All practices 
and trees 
1st 10.7(0.31) 3.06 (0.17) 29.66 (0.46) 43.43 (0.50) 
2nd 17.3(0.38) 5.35 (0.23) 26.73 (0.44) 49.37 (0.50) 
3rd 4.33 (0.20) 8.36 (0.28 16.72(0.37) 29.41 (0.46) 
4th 5.41 (0.23) 9.55 (0.29) 10.83 (0.31) 25.80 (0.44) 
5th 3.75 (0.19) 11.88 (0.32) 9.06 (0.29) 24.69 (0.43) 
Lr Chi2(4) 51.36 (0.00) 23.81 (0.00) 73.79 (0.00) 70.00 (0.00) 
"Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author's calculations from field survey data. 
Land CONSERVATION IN KENYA: THE ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 9 
The likelihood test ratio results presented in the last row of tables 13-16 indicate 
statistical independence and significant differences in the probability of adoption of land 
conservation practices across wealth categories. Unfortunately, we cannot test empirically 
the impact of each of these individual assets on adoption of land conservation because 
these assets are arguably endogenous and our data set lacks appropriate instrumental 
variables to control for this. 
The foregoing descriptive analysis suggests that there is clear correlation between 
property rights and population density. In other words, our descriptive analysis indicates 
that our data support Boserup's hypothesis and the evolutionary land rights theory. Further, 
security of tenure is important for adoption of land conservation practices. The analysis 
does not, however, uncover a clear relationship between the status of poverty and the 
adoption of conservation methods. We test the robustness of these results using 
multivariate econometric analysis in the next section. 
Regression results 
rhe regression results from a random effects discrete choice model of land conservation practices are reported in tables 17 and 18. The results suggest that the panel-level 
variance is important (rho is not equal to zero [Wooldridge, 2002; STATACorp, 1999]). 
In all regressions, the null hypothesis that rho = 0 is rejected at 1% level of significance. 
We therefore base our discussion on the random effects results (Tables 17 and 18). The 
multinomial logit results support the random effects probit regression results. To save on 
space these results are not presented but are available from the author upon request. 
The Chi-square test statistic for the estimated models with 27 and 24 degrees of freedom 
ranges from 66 to 258. The null hypothesis that the non-intercept coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero is rejected at 0.01% levels for adoption of all practices (both individual and 
combined practices). This implies that the underlying empirical probit models are highly 
significant in explaining choice of particular land use practices, and confirms the stability 
of the estimated models. 
The results show that household investment in soil bunds, terracing and planting of 
drought resistant vegetation and trees is influenced by a wide range of factors. However, 
the likelihood of adoption of various practices is quite modest. The predicted probability 
of adoption of soil bunds is estimated at only 5%, the probability of terracing at 2%, and 
of planting drought resistant vegetation and trees at 10%. We note that the determinants 
of adoption of land conservation practices tend to differ from one practice to another. 
Physical assets, a proxy for household capacity to invest, land tenure security and socio-
institutional factors have different impacts on adoption of the three different practices. 
For example, most of the factors favouring soil bunds have either insignificant or reverse 
impacts on terracing. A similar conclusion appears to be the case for planting drought 
resistant vegetation and trees and terracing. This finding is not uncommon in the literature 
(see for example, Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). 
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practices (Table 18). This is consistent with our a priori expectations of the sign of a, 
andx, in equations 1 and 4, respectively, and supports literature arguing that private 
landowners are more likely to conserve land as they are assured of retaining the long-
term gains from investments in conservation. Furthermore, this supports results of our 
statistical analysis (tables 9 and A3), which show that security of tenure is important for 
adoption of land conservation practices. These results are also consistent with previous 
literature (see, for example, Place and Otsuka, 2002, 2000; Place and Swallow, 2000; 
Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003; Deininger and Jin, 2002; Jacoby et al., 2002). Results 
for adoption of soil bunds support findings by Otsuka et al. (2003), who find that traditional 
land tenure institutions are not inefficient with respect to the decision to plant trees. 
Household characteristics, markets and location factors 
Our results do not uncover any important impact of household characteristics on adoption 
of land conservation practices except for higher education, where farmers with more 
education are more likely to adopt land conservation practices than their uneducated 
counterparts. In general, household characteristics increase the likelihood of adopting all 
land conservation practices combined, though this impact is insignificant, the results 
support earlier findings by Place and Otsuka (2002), Jacoby et al. (2002), and Deininger 
and Jin (2002). Experimenting with years of education rather than educational dummies 
yields the same conclusion as for the dummies and so we retain the latter. 
Market factors are observed to have different impacts on adoption of land conservation 
practices relative to non-adoption. Livestock prices discourage adoption of all conservation 
practices except for planting of drought resistant vegetation/trees. This result is interesting 
given that most resistant vegetation is used as fodder for livestock. The results here 
support the expectation that better livestock prices may bias production decisions towards 
livestock rather than farming. Maize prices are an important factor for planting of drought 
resistant vegetation/trees and all practices combined, while the price of beans is important 
for soil bunds and terracing. Distance to markets is associated with lower probabilities of 
adoption of soil bunds and all practices combined, but has unexpectedly insignificant 
impacts on the other practices. Distance to a source of water also turns out to have the 
unexpected positive signs on the continuum of rights models, except for planting of 
drought resistant vegetation/trees, implying that distance may not be an important 
determinant of adoption of any land conservation practice. However, this variable has 
the expected and significant impact for soil bunds and terracing in the property right 
dummy model. 
Divisional dummies indicate that farmers located in all other divisions are less likely 
to invest in land improvements relative to those located in Loitoktok division. The results 
are consistent across all models and imply that farmers in better agro-ecological and 
climate zones are more likely to invest in land improvements than their counterparts in 
unfavourable zones. 8 The reverse is observed for terracing, however, where results imply 
that farmers in Loitoktok are less likely to adopt terracing than those located in other 
divisions, probably because of differences in terrain/topography, which our study is unable 
to control for due to lack of adequate data. Our expectation was that soils are more likely 
to erode (and thus a higher probability of adoption of conservation practices) in Ngong 
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division, where slopes are steeper than in other regions. That the magnitude of the 
coefficient for all practices combined for the division is larger than coefficients for other 
divisional dummies in both models (with continuum of rights and dummy for rights) 
supports this expectation. 
These empirical results are supported by the data. Descriptive statistics indicate, for 
example, that only 1% of households in Loitoktok division invested in terracing and (his 
was the division with the lowest proportion adopting this practice. Ngong division topped 
in adoption of terraces (31%). Farmers in Loitoktok were also found to be more likely to 
invest in drought resistant vegetation (31%) than all other divisions. In Central division, 
adoption of soil bunds and drought resistant vegetation (15% each) were relatively more 
important than in other divisions. 
Though divisional dummies are used as proxies for agro-ecological zones, they could 
also be taken as proxies for community controls, which are also captured by population 
density and prices. Models without regional dummies would control for population 
densities across regions, while including regional dummies helps us to look at the impact 
of determinants of conservation practices within regions. To test for the impact of various 
covariates on conservation and land rights across regions, we re-run all regression models 
without divisional dummies in order to test the impact of population density and prices 
on conservation and land rights. The results show little change in the signs and magnitudes 
of the retained variables, implying that the divisional dummies are important on their 
own in influencing conservation (see Appendix Table AL9). 
Assets and land conservation 
The coefficients for asset variables show mixed results. Rent income 1 0 is associated with 
a higher probability of adopting all land use practices, except terracing. Number of adults 
in a household and transfers are inversely related to adoption of some land conservation 
practices. These results imply less reliance on agriculture for households with more adults 
and higher transfers. As expected, increased investment in physical capital (fixed 
technology) favours land conservation relative to non-conservation. This is portrayed by 
the positive impact of the value of farm equipment on adoption of all practices. Amount 
of biomass available at the village level exerts a positive impact on planting of drought 
resistant vegetation/trees and adoption of all practices combined, but a negative impact 
on soil bunds and terracing. These results are collaborated by the regressions with a 
binary variable for property rights (Table 18). 
Although there are mixed results for some practices, overall the regression results 
show that poverty in assets could hinder adoption of land conservation practices. 
Specifically, rent incomes, investment in farm equipment and availability of biomass are 
important assets favouring adoption of all land conservation practices. Comparing these 
results with the results of the statistical analysis, we conclude that although the status of 
poverty (derived from actual expenditures) may not be an important determinant of 
adoption of land conservation practices, poverty in assets is a crucial factor (Reardon 
and Vosti, 1995). 
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Table 18: Determinants of choice of land conservation practices (with property rights dummy) 
Variable Construct ion Terracing Planting drought Al l conservat ion 
of soi l bunds resistant vegetation/trees pract ices 
Coeff icient z-stat. Coeff ic ient z-stat. Coeff ic ient z-stat. Coeff ic ient z-stat. 
Land rights 
property right regime (1=private 
0= common) •0.60" -(1.84) 1.86*** (2.78) 1.55"* (4.08) 1.40*** (5.13) 
Household assets 
Log number of adults 0.09 (0.36) -1 .84*" -(2.92) -0.29 -(1.24) -0.36 -(1.51) 
Log rent income 0.02** (1.86) 0 .19* " (4.32) -0.02** -(2.08) 0.01 (1.14) 
Log transfer income received 0.01 (0.23) -0.11 -(1.52) -0.09*** -(3.24) 0.01 (0.49) 
Log value of farm equipment 0.03 (0.41) 0.36** (1.89) 0 .56"* (6.38) 0.48*** (5.33) 
Log biomass per acre -1.38 -(1.90) -0.30 -(0.24) 1.54*** (3.12) 1.52*** (2.69) 
Household characteristics 
Log age of household head 0.16 (0.42) 0.03 (0.05) 0.21 (0.75) 0.09 (0.33) 
Sex -0.10 -(0.50) -0.09 -(0.26) 0.03 (0.18) 0.00 -(0.01) 
Marital status (1=married) 0.01 (0.04) 0.15 (0.26) -0.15 -(0.69) 0.26 (1.15) 
Has primary school education 
(relative to no education) 0.01 (0.04) 0.34 (0.57) -0.03 -(0.12) 0.11 (0.49) 
Has secondary school education 0.01 (0.03) 0.05 (0.08) 0.05 (0.20) 0.37 (1.40) 
Has post secondary education 1.22*** (5.02) 6.85*** (6.68) 2.57*** (11.66) 5.60*** (14.79) 
Market characteristics 
Log price per cattle -1 .24"* -(3.48) 1.45*** (2.65) -0 .51" -(2.02) -0.90*** -(3.05) 
Log price per goat -0.57* -(1.67) -8.49*** -(5.97) 0.42 (1.48) -0.99*** -(3.56) 
Log price per kilo of maize 4 .43" * (6.14) 1.33 (0.67) -4.29*** -(5.93) -0.88 -(1.47) 
Log price per kilo of beans -1 .32*" -(3.85) 1.48*** (3.42) -0.05 -(0.24) 0.04 (0.22) 
Log distance to market 0.02 (0.08) -0.55 -(1.11) -0.03 -(0.18) -0.02 -(0.14) 
Distance to source of water -1 .62"* -(3.86) -1 .92" -(1.85) 1.23*** (2.66) 0.05 (0.16) 
Log population density 1 .24"* (3.48) 1 .45"* (2.65) -0 .51" -(2.02) -0.90*** -(3.05) 
Agro-ecological zones 
Mashuru -6.83*** -(6.03) 8.79*** (4.40) -2.76*** -(3.96) -3 .01"* -(5.08) 
Ngong -1.84*** -(2.58) 7.68*** (3.74) -4 .34"* -(5.56) -4 .15*" -(6.97) 
Central -4,14*** -(5.34) 16.28*** (5.53) -2.85*** -(5.29) -2.30*** -(4.25) 
Magadi -5.71*** -(4.99) 7.24*** (3.28) -0.98 -(1.18) -2.75*** -(2.58) 
Namanga -4.41"* -(4.74) 14.78*** (5.16) -3.96*** -(6.85) -4.20*** -(6.60) 
Constant 11.28 (1.56) 23.18 (1.57) -21.12"* -(3.88) -7.60 -(1.41) 
Number of observations 1600 1600 1600 1600 
Wald chP(24) 131.72 220.51 65.71 233.73 
Log Likelihood -241.89 -358.38 -124.14 -351.66 
Rho 0.93 0.98 0.84 0.79 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: 
chibafi(01) 223.06 -358.38 241.27 256.88 
" * , " , * : Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The foregoing conclusion finds support in further analysis with assets. Land and total 
livestock owned (cattle and small ruminants) are not included in the estimating model 
because they are arguably endogenous to conservation. As a sensitivity analysis, however, 
we run regression models with the asset index derived from these assets to investigate 
their impact on the adoption of conservation practices. The results are presented in 
Appendix Tables A4 and A5. Other than for differences in signs and magnitude of the 
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coefficients of some of the other variables, the results are consistent with earlier regression 
results and also the descriptive analysis results for terracing in Table 14. Specifically, 
the asset index has significant positive impacts on adoption of soil bunds and terracing, 
but a negative impact on planting drought resistant vegetation/trees and adoption of all 
practices combined. The findings for soil bunds and terracing therefore confirm that 
poverty in assets will discourage adoption of soil bunds and terracing, which supports 
findings in earlier studies (Somda et al., 2002; Shiferaw and Holden, 1999, 2001; Li et 
al., 1998; Alemu, 1999). 
The Boserup hypothesis and the evolutionary land rights theory 
Table 17 shows that population density is associated with higher probability of adoption 
of all practices except for terracing. The same result is observed for soil bunds and 
terracing in Table 18. These results confirm that population density increases the need 
for conservation and intensification (Boserup, 1965; Tiffen et al., 1994; Place and Otsuka, 
2000). 
To further test the Boserup hypothesis, we run a different version of model la where 
we test the impact of population density on land conservation without controlling for 
property rights. The results are presented in Table A6. The empirical results support our 
descriptive results and also earlier regression findings (Table 17), i.e., our results confirm 
the Boserup hypothesis. Furthermore, the results show that holding land rights constant, 
population density has a significant positive impact on the adoption of land conservation 
practices, specifically adoption of soil bunds and planting of drought resistant vegetation. 
We also test for the evolutionary land rights theory by analysing empirically the 
impact of population density on different land rights. The results are presented in Table 
19. They confirm that large population densities are associated with individual land 
rights. This is shown by the positive significant coefficient for population density with 
respect to the right to bequeath, full ownership rights and tenancy rights. Further, we 
note that the impact of population density on tenancy rights is much less than the impact 
on bequest and full ownership rights. Finally, the impact of population density on common 
property rights is negative and significant, implying that common property arrangements 
are likely to be found in areas of low population densities; thus confirming the evolutionary 
land rights theory. 1 1 
The same table investigates impact of household assets, household characteristics 
and market factors on land rights. There seems to be no clear pattern of the impact of 
each of these groups of factors on different land rights. Number of adults and rent income 
seem to be important for bequest and full ownership rights, but not for tenancy and 
common property rights. All other assets tend to be unimportant except investment in 
farm equipment, which is important for full ownership rights. Education seems to matter 
only for bequest and tenancy rights, while market factors do not seem to matter. We do 
not include locational dummies in this model because there is little or no variation in 
some land rights among the sample taken from some divisions. 
LAND CONSERVATION IN KENYA: T H E ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Table 19: Determinants of land rights 
3 5 
Variable Right to bequeath Full ownership Tenancy rights Common property 
rights rights 
Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. 
Household assets 
Log number of adults 0.55"* (2.96) 0.12 (0.78) -1.40*** -(3.81) -0.12 -(0.66) 
Log rent income 0.03** (2,12) 0.01 (0.61) -0.02* -(1.77) -0.03 -(1.29) 
Log transfer income received -0.02 -(0,70) -0.005 -(0.23) -0.01 -(0.12) -0.002 -(0.08) 
Log value of farm equipment -0.06 -(1.14) 0.10" (2.02) -0.29*** -(2.95) -0.03 -(0.57) 
Log biomass per acre -0.77*** -(3.16) -1.09*** -(4.04) -2.14*** -(2.62) 0.50** (1.83) 
Household characteristics 
Log age of household head 0.12 (0.47) 0.07 (0.31) 0.29 (0.55) -0.08 -(0.28) 
Sex 0.18 (1.10) 0.07 (0.51) -0.34 -(1.17) -0.05 -(0.28) 
Marital status (1=married) -0.11 -(0.52) -0.34* -(1.70) -0.89*** -(2.25) 0.16 (0.63) 
Has primary school education 
(relative to no education) 0.14 (0.58) -0.18 -(0.85) 2.85*** (4.33) -0.03 -(0.11) 
Has secondary school education 0.25 (0.87) -0.25 -(1.00) 3.03*** (4.72) 0.16 (0.56) 
Has post secondary education -0.86* -(1.70) -0.52 -(1.38) 3.61"* (4.42) 0.73 (1.32) 
Market factors 
Log price per cattle 0.29 (1.57) 0.17 (0.97) -1.26*" -(2.56) -0.07 -(0.31) 
Log price per goat 0.06 (0.23) -0.08 -(0.37) 0.87 (1.56) -0.23 -(0.82) 
Log price per kilo of maize -0.22 -(0.43) -0.29 -(0.64) -1.24 -(0.89) 0.03 (0.04) 
Log price per kilo of beans -0.48 -(1.04) 0.02 (0.05) -1.42 -(1.37) -0.53 -(0.96) 
Log distance to market 0.02 (0.16) 0.09 (0.69) 0.38 (1.41) 0.10 (0.86) 
Distance to source of water 0.75*** (5.17) 0.86*** (5.62) -0.06 -(0.21) -0.63*** -(5.92) 
Log population density 2.68*** (9.85) 2.20*" (7.09) 1.20** (2.15) -4.86"* -(7.98) 
Number of observations 1600 1600 1600 1600 
Wald chP(18) 132.70 121.65 58.44 132.52 
Log Likelihood -377.70 -462.20 -142.68 -308.45 
Rho 0.89 0.86 0.93 0.89 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: chibar'f01) 657.67 820.90 285.76 470.78 
Policy simulations 
We use our empirical results to simulate the ceteris paribus effects of various policies on 
adoption of land conservation practices. The simulations are based on the coefficients of 
Model 1 (Table 17) and the means of the variables (Appendix Table Al) . The results are 
presented in Table 20. The table details sample proportions (actual percentages of farmers 
adopting a given practice), and the predicted (base) probability of adopting each practice. 
Our random effects model has not been able to predict perfectly the adoption of each 
practice and so the actual sample proportions and the predicted proportions differ. The 
sample proportions indicate that only 8.3%, 7.06% and 18.7% of all farmers adopted 
blocking soil erosion outlets, land terracing and planting of drought resistant vegetation, 
respectively, as land conservation strategies. Our model over predicts adoption of all 
land conservation practices. The results also imply that on average all farmers adopted at 
least one practice. For example, the predictions imply that 29% of all farmers would 
adopt construction of soil bunds, 61% would plant drought resistant vegetation and trees, 
and 15% would adopt land terracing. 
The results are interpreted as follows: For the first policy option, increasing the 
proportion of farmers with individual rights by 10% would increase the probability of 
adoption of soil bunds from 0.291 to 0.298. 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
